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I’m delighted to stand before so many people. I’m also very happy when I get
to work with models with many people. That is the key to the framework for
which Ed Prescott and I were cited by the Nobel committee: The people are
introduced explicitly in the models. Their decision problems are fully dynamic
– people are forward-looking. That is one of the prerequisites for what we 
ultimately seek, a framework in which we can evaluate economic policy.
The eminent researcher and 1995 Nobel laureate in economics, Bob
Lucas, from whom I’ve learned a lot, wrote (Lucas, 1980): “One of the functions
of theoretical economics is to provide fully articulated, artiﬁcial economic
systems that can serve as laboratories in which policies that would be prohibitiv-
ely expensive to experiment with in actual economies can be tested out at
much lower cost… (696). Our task, as I see it…is to write a FORTRAN program
that will accept speciﬁc economic policy rules as ‘input’ and will generate as
‘output’ statistics describing the operating characteristics of time series we
care about, which are predicted to result from these policies” (709–10). The
desired environments to which Lucas refers would make use of information
on “individual responses [that] can be documented relatively cheaply…by
means of…censuses, panels [and] other surveys…” (710). Lucas seems to
suggest that economic researchers place people in desired model environ-
ments and record how they behave under alternative policy rules.
In practice, that is easier said than done. The key tool macroeconomists
use is the computational experiment. Using it, the researcher performs precisely
what I just described – places the model’s people in the desired environment
and records their behavior. But the purpose of the computational experiment
is broader than simply to evaluate policy rules. The computational experiment
is useful for answering a host of questions, in particular quantitative ones, that
is, those for which we seek numerical answers. When evaluating government
policy, the policy is stated in the form of a rule that speciﬁes how the govern-
ment will behave – what action to take under various contingencies – today and
in the indeﬁnite future. That’s one reason it would be so difﬁcult and prohib-
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itively expensive to perform the alternative Lucas mentions, namely, to test the
policies in actual economies.
THE COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIMENT
These models contain millions of people. My tiny laptop contains several
such models. People are characterized by their preferences over goods and
leisure into the indeﬁnite future. Their budget constraints are explicit. They
receive income from working and from owning capital, and their choices
must remain within their budget constraints, given the prices they face – wage
rates and interest rates, for example. In other words, these models are explicit
about people’s dynamic decision problems.
The models also contain thousands of businesses. Implied is a description
of aggregate production possibilities – say, in the form of an aggregate pro-
duction function. It describes the technology for converting inputs of capital
and labor into output of goods, which can be used for consumption or to add
to future productive capital – investment.
A key aspect of the production function is its description of the technology
level and its change over time. It’s a broad concept at this level of abstraction.
Technological change encompasses anything that affects the transformation,
given by the aggregate production function, of aggregate inputs of capital
and labor into goods and services. It includes, of course, the usual outcomes
of innovative activity, but also could include, again at this level of abstraction,
factors such as oil shocks, new environmental regulations, changes in the legal
constraints affecting the nature of contracting between workers and ﬁrms, 
government provision of infrastructure, and the loss in ﬁnancial intermediat-
ion associated with banking panics – all elements one might want to study in
more detail, depending on the question. But, for many questions, it makes
perfect sense to include them implicitly as part of the technology level.
I’ve described two elements of typical models used for computational 
experiments: the millions of model inhabitants and the thousands of busi-
nesses. An essential aspect, however, is the calibration of the model environ-
ment. In a sense, models are measuring devices: they need to be calibrated,
or otherwise we would have little faith in the answers they provide. In this sense,
they are like thermometers. We know what a thermometer is supposed to 
register if we dip it into water with chunks of ice, or into a pot of boiling water.
In the same sense, the model should give approximately correct answers to
questions whose answers we already know. Usually, there are many such 
questions. In the context of business-cycle analysis, we know a lot about the long
run of the economy, or we may use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, say,
for the United States or similar panel studies from other nations to collect the
data to calibrate the model. Thus, the calibration is part of the action of ma-
king the quantitative answer as reliable as possible.
A computational experiment yields time series of the aggregate decisions
of the model economy’s people. Through the model formulation and its 
calibration, we have determined what the economic environment should
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economy make their decisions over time, and the computer records their 
decisions. We obtain time series as if we were confronted with an actual 
economy. These time series may be described statistically and compared with
analogous statistics from the data for the nation under study. In a business-
cycle study, these statistics may include standard deviations of detrended 
aggregates describing the amplitudes of their business-cycle movements, as
well as correlation coefﬁcients as measures of their comovements.
A SIMPLE EXAMPLE
Now I should like to walk you through a simple model – substantially simpler
than that in Kydland and Prescott (1982), for example. It contains house-
hold and business sectors. To make it as straightforward as possible, I’ll 
abstract from the government. For the same reason, there will be no foreign
sector in this model. Moreover, for simplicity steady-state growth is zero. I have
two main goals: to discuss the sense in which the model contains household
and business sectors, and to give examples of what’s involved in calibrating the
parameters (see Cooley and Prescott 1995 for a detailed description of the
practice of calibration, and Kydland 1995 for an elaborate example in which
all the details have been worked out).
First, we have a description of the typical household’s preferences in the
form of a utility function to be maximized:
Business cycles involve uncertainty about the future, so what one aims to max-
imize is expected (denoted by E) utility as a function of consumption, C, and
leisure, L, over the indeﬁnite future. It may seem a little far-fetched to be
summing the utility from today (period zero, let’s say) to inﬁnity. I’ll return to
that assumption. The parameter   is a number slightly less than 1 and can be
calibrated from knowledge of the long-run real interest. It simply describes
the degree of people’s impatience. Additional parameters are   and  , also to
be calibrated. I’ll return to   in a minute. The parameter   is what we may
call a risk-aversion parameter, about which ﬁnance people know a lot. I could
have picked a more general functional form in the class of so-called constant-
elasticity-of-substitution functions. This particular one is consistent with the
empirical observation that, as the U.S. real wage has doubled over the past
decades, long-run hours worked per household have changed little.
The model formulation being presented is the statement of a planner’s
problem whose solution can be shown to be the equilibrium of an economy
inhabited by millions of people with preferences such as this utility function.
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the economy produces. The right-hand side of the ﬁrst equality states that the
economy produces output using capital – factories, machines, ofﬁce build-
ings – along with the labor input of workers, and the technology level is de-
noted by z. In other words, this is total output – gross domestic product – as
given by the production function, the speciﬁcation of which is essential to all
of macroeconomics. Moreover, GDP has to equal gross domestic income, the
sum of capital and labor income, which appears on the right-hand side of the
second equality.
In addition to this resource constraint, we have a constraint on time, which
here can be devoted either to leisure or to labor input:
Lt + Nt = 1
The right-hand side equals 1; that is, without loss of generality I’ve chosen
units so that if we add all the discretionary time – total time net of sleep and
personal care – across people, it equals 1.
Then we have two relations representing key aspects of what makes an eco-
nomy dynamic:
Kt+1 = (1–  )Kt + It
and
zt+1 =  zt +  t+1
The ﬁrst, where Kt denotes the capital stock at the beginning of period t, 
describes how the capital stock at any time depends on past investment 
decisions, where   is the depreciation rate. Finally, the technology level is 
all-important because it’s what, in this simple model, gives rise to uncertainty.
If, as is borne out by the data, the parameter   is close to 1, the relation says
that new technological innovations, given by  , are long-lasting. One usually
imagines that this random variable   is drawn from a normal probability
distribution, whose variance can be estimated from the data.
As we have seen, this simple economy already has a number of parameters
we need to calibrate. One reason for presenting this model is so I can discuss
two typical examples of calibration, namely of the parameters   in the utility
functions and   in the production function. Suppose we went to a panel of
thousands of people and calculated the average of how much time they 
devote to market activity. That ﬁgure pins down, via a steady-state ﬁrst-order
condition, the value of   that makes this average identical in the model 
economy to that in the data. Similarly, with regard to the parameter  , a 
property of the model is that if we look up National Income and Product
Accounts data and ﬁnd, say, that out of total gross domestic income, on the
average 36 percent is compensation for capital input and 64 percent repre-
sents labor income, then that calibrates the parameter   to 0.36.
I’ve used this model as a vehicle for talking about the two key sectors of the
economy. The household sector contains lots of people characterized by the
344
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utility function – a description of the preferences over consumption and leisure
into the indeﬁnite future. The business sector is described by the technology
for producing goods and services from capital and labor inputs. I have talked
about the features that make this model dynamic, and about a key source of
uncertainty. One could include many other such features. Ed Prescott men-
tioned in his lecture the so-called time-to-build assumption, which would make
the model more detailed, as in the 1982 paper to which the Nobel committee
refers. That model also contains inventories, as well as both permanent and
temporary shocks. What to include depends on the question the model is 
designed to address. The question for which this framework was ﬁrst put to
use by Ed Prescott and me can be stated as follows: If technology shocks were
the only source of impulse, what portion of business-cycle ﬂuctuations would
still have remained? The model produced a preliminary answer to that 
question: well over one-half, and that answer has pretty much been conﬁrmed
to be somewhere around 70 percent. The model provided measurement.
DOES BEING DIFFERENT MATTER?
Returning to the utility function, I assume in my prototype model above that
preferences are given by some function that covers the entire future – goes to
inﬁnity. In other words, we have great power in setting up this economy: we
can decide that people are immortal! That assumption turns out to be 
surprisingly innocuous for many questions. Of course it makes sense to check
if it makes a difference and, as economists often conclude in many contexts,
it depends. For many business-cycle questions, the answer is no. That’s rather
surprising. If you think about mortal people and their life-cycle behavior, 
typically they earn relatively little labor income early in their lives, then experi-
ence a substantial increase in income when they enter the middle stage, and
ﬁnally, for those who live long enough, enter a period in which they will have
retired from market work. In other words, the labor-earnings proﬁle is decid-
edly hump-shaped. But we also know that people prefer a consumption 
stream that’s much more even over time. So there will be a period in which
they spend more than their income, then spend less for two or three decades,
and ﬁnally revert to spending more than their labor income toward the end
of their lives. Moreover, the behavior in various other ways typically is quite
interesting at the beginning and end of one’s working life.
Thus, it would seem that life-cycle behavior could matter substantially.
Víctor Ríos-Rull (1996), however, ﬁnds for a typical business-cycle question
such as the one I mentioned above that if we employ an economy with mortal
consumers in which realistic life-cycle behavior is included, then as we aggregate
across all of these people the time series in the computational experiments,
we get approximately the same answer as in the immortal-consumer economy.
Of course, there are a lot of questions for which life-cycle behavior does make
a big difference. Among those are the economic impact on savings, interest
rates, and tax rates of immigration, Social Security reform, and baby boom-
ers’ retirement, to mention a few.
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To give you a sense of how different people are and emphasize the need
for including them when addressing some questions, I’ll show you some num-
bers. Figure 1 displays the average life-cycle proﬁle of people’s efﬁciency of
working in the market sector, as indicated by their real wage rates.
The graph shows a major reason for the hump-shaped proﬁle of people’s
labor earnings depending on age. The curve is normalized so that it averages
1. It starts at around 0.5 and rises rapidly so that for a long time span later in
people’s working lives their efﬁciency is more than twice what it is when they
enter the workforce. In addition to these life-cycle differences in workers’
skills comes the fact that workers are quite different in their abilities as they
enter the work force, depending on education and other factors. An inter-
esting study of the aggregate implications of the interaction between, on the
one hand, the labor input divided into low- and high-skilled workers and, on
the other hand, the capital input divided into structures and equipment is in
Krusell, Ohanian, Ríos-Rull, and Violante (2000). Their focus is on real-wage
movements in particular. For a more elaborate discussion of cyclical implica-
tions, especially as they pertain to measured labor-input ﬂuctuations, see
Kydland and Petersen (1997), on which some parts of this lecture are based.
Figure 2 displays the age distribution of the U.S. population in 1994 and
that projected to 2020. The vertical axis shows the percentage of people of
different ages. You see the noticeable hump in 1994 roughly in the 30-to-40
age range. Predictably, there will be a corresponding hump in 2020. Of course,
a reason to worry about this empirical pattern is that by 2020 many, if not
most, of these baby boomers will have retired, putting a major strain on the
Figure 1. United States, Life-Cycle Wage Proﬁles. Source: Cross-sectional data based on 1990
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government budget constraint in general and the Social Security system in
particular. A beautiful study of the effects the baby boomers in Spain (where
immigration represents much less of a complication for the population 
dynamics than for the United States) may have on savings and real interest 
rates is in Ríos-Rull (2001).
Finally, Figure 3 tells us about the age distribution of immigrants to the
United States. The curve for U.S. natives is the same as that for 1994 in Figure
2, except now each age group is ﬁve years wide and so the curve is smoother.
The key message of the ﬁgure is that immigrants to the United States are 
relatively quite young.
These features of the data all correspond to elements that one may wish to
add to a model of heterogeneous individuals – something we as economists
have become adept at doing. When Víctor Ríos was my colleague at Carnegie
Mellon University in the early 1990s, computers were not nearly as powerful
as they are today. Víctor did early pioneering research with such models. Back
then, some could take a long time – maybe a day or two – for the computer to
calculate the model time series to analyze.
All of these features to which I’ve alluded – the age-dependent work efﬁci-
ency, population dynamics, and so on – can and have been added to models
such as those used by Víctor Ríos and others in the past decade. A student of
Víctor’s and mine at Carnegie Mellon, Kjetil Storesletten, now at the
University of Oslo, made an interesting study of the interaction of immigration
with government ﬁscal policy. Stark predictions have been made by people
who do intergenerational accounting, suggesting that tax rates will have to rise
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constraint to be satisﬁed. The interesting question Storesletten (2000) asks is,
To what extent can one avoid that tax increase by raising the rate of immi-
gration, especially if one could be selective in the immigrants to admit?
Our ability to compute equilibriums for economies with very different 
people has expanded dramatically in recent years, with many studies heavily
inﬂuenced by the pioneering paper by Per Krusell and Tony Smith (1998).
Today, we see interesting research with the implication, for example, that 
income and wealth distributions vary and evolve over time, for example
Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2004). This exciting work is made possible
through advances in our understanding of dynamic methodology, but also
because of the power of today’s computers.
NO MONEY?
A belief sometimes expressed is that this framework is used for analyzing real
phenomena only. That’s a huge misunderstanding. The same framework is
used also to study monetary phenomena. For example, one could use it to ask
the perennial question, Do monetary shocks cause business cycles?
[Before going on, I would like to say that there are two people whom I
would have loved to see in Stockholm this week, but who will not be here be-
cause they have passed away. One is my father, Martin; the other Scott
Freeman, who died some months ago. I’ve had the fortune to work with the
greatest economist in the world, Ed Prescott. But Scott Freeman was not far
behind. He was a tremendous economist, with great insight and innovative
348
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ability. He and I did work on the interaction of monetary phenomena and real
factors. In his memory, I’ve included two pictures. In the ﬁrst, you see Scott in
a pensive mood. In the second, he’s enjoying himself at a party a few years
ago.]
Here’s a way to introduce money into a framework such as the one I’ve 
described to you. Suppose people purchase a whole variety of sizes of goods.
We might as well say there’s a continuum, from tiny to large. People make
small purchases and large. Because of the cost of carrying out transactions
using means of exchange (checks, for example) backed by interest-earning
assets, it has to be optimal to make the small purchases using currency and
the large purchases using these other means of exchange. The extent to
which you want to use either becomes an economic decision whose incentives
change over the cycle. They change for the choice of the proportion of the
two means of exchange one wishes to hold, as well as for the frequency with
which one replenishes one’s liquid balances. The ﬁnding from this study with
Scott Freeman (2000) is that money ﬂuctuates procyclically even when the
central bank does nothing. In other words, if one ﬁnds, as was the case over
extended periods of U.S. history, that money moves up and down with output,
that fact by itself says nothing about money causing output.
Because these models are inhabited by people, we can evaluate the welfare
cost of inﬂation. In a project with Scott Freeman and Espen Henriksen
(forthcoming), a Carnegie Mellon Ph.D. student, we did exactly that. We are
now pushing that project further, asking, for example, what will happen if
transaction costs drop over time, which already has happened and likely will
continue to do so.
Scott Freeman, The Thinker
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I presented to you a closed-economy model. In the past 10 or 15 years, however,
economists have put this framework to use to study the interaction of many
nations. This is a particularly interesting ﬁeld because anomalies abound for
bright young (and even old) researchers to try to account for. Here’s an example
which, on the face of it, may seem like an anomaly: For many nations, cyclically
the trade balance is the worst when one’s goods are the cheapest. It turns out
that once you write down a model in which nations trade, as for example
Backus, Kehoe, and I did (1994), capital accumulation is important for the
answer. Another factor is that there’s “nonsynchronized” technological change
in the different nations, which over time spills over from one nation to the
next. The conclusion is that the empirical regularity to which I just referred is
not an anomaly at all. It’s what the model suggests would happen.
Here’s a cute application. I loved to use it in my undergraduate course. I
came across an article in the Wall Street Journal in April 1998 reporting that
the International Monetary Fund dispatched representatives to Argentina,
supposedly to convince the Argentine government to cool the economy. The
reasons stated were threefold: (i) high growth rates, 6.5 to 7 percent annually,
coming on top of strong growth that started in 1990, interrupted only by the
Tequila crisis around 1995; (ii) export prices falling dramatically; and (iii)
the trade deﬁcit returning. Sound bad? As it turns out, these comovements
are what a standard model would tell us to expect in an economy that’s doing
well. Our framework dictates that these three features, in combination, ought
to be favorable. I should say that I have no way of knowing if the Wall Street
Journal to some extent misstated the IMF’s basis for going to Argentina. For
example, the IMF may have been worried also about ﬁscal “overstimulation,”
as one might call it.
350
Scott in the quest for inspiration with co-author.
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THE CASE OF ARGENTINA
Recently, a number of studies of great depressions have been carried out.
Many were put together for a conference at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis and will be collected in a volume edited by Tim Kehoe and Ed
Prescott. The reasons I mention the great depression studies are twofold.
First, people used to think great depressions are events of such magnitude
that we need a separate framework to study them. I think this conference showed
that any such suggestion is nonsense. The second reason is that this confe-
rence gave Carlos Zarazaga and me (2002) the impetus to study the case of
Argentina, which had a great depression in the 1980s.
To give you a sense of what has happened in Argentina in the last 50 years,
Figure 4 displays the log of its real GDP per person of working age. Logs are
useful because constant growth rate translates into a straight line, and whether
Argentina’s GDP is as small as it was in the 1950s, or much larger in 1998, a
one-cm deviation from trend, say, represents the same percent deviation. So
that’s how to read this picture. You see the dramatic decline in the 1980s 
– over 20 percent – during Argentina’s “Lost Decade,” qualifying it as a great
depression. An even larger and much faster decline took place after 1998.
As already mentioned, Argentina’s economy experienced an upturn in the
1990s. That episode, to Carlos and me (forthcoming), was even more interesting
than the depression. Clearly, Argentina grew fast by most standards. The 
surprising thing was – and only the model could tell us this – when you put
the numbers for total factor productivity growth into a standard model and
calibrate it, the model says that investment should have been much greater in
the 1990s. Of course, for that very reason, the capital stock should have been
much larger by the end of the decade.
Figure 5 contains a picture of real GDP for Argentina, again in log scale.
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You can see the growth in the 1990s. Suppose we put into the model the 
actual numbers for total factor productivity measured by the method Robert
Solow (1957) proposed for measuring them in a growth context. We use the
period up to 1980 to estimate statistically the process for the technology level.
The model accounts well for the great depression of the 1980s, and also for
the downturn after 1999. The large discrepancy is for the 1990s where the
model says that growth in the 1990s should have been much higher. The
third curve is included to indicate what happens if we assume that the capital
stock in 1999 is taken from the actual data for that year and then we start the
model up again in 1999. The model accounts well for the remaining years.
What if we look more closely at the capital input? I mentioned it as repre-
senting the key anomaly. That is borne out in Figure 6, which displays an even
greater discrepancy between model prediction and data for the 1990s than in
the case of GDP. The difference in 1999 is almost 20 percent. As in Figure 5,
the third curve displays the model prediction if we start with the 1999 capital
stock so as to account for the remaining ﬁve years.
For Argentina, the data in Figure 7 must be extremely depressing because
they show the fall in capital stock per working-age person (which would look
more or less the same in per-capita terms). This represents the quantity of
productive capacity in Argentina, given by the best measurements available.
The capital stock in 2003, per person, was much lower than in 1982. The 
neoclassical growth model then would imply, as the data show, much lower
wage rates, wage rates that were much, much lower than those that would have
prevailed in Argentina if the economy had grown the way other nations’ eco-
nomies did. This is bad news for the future of Argentina’s poor (and it 
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certainly has been so far). Clearly Argentina needs to grow at a rapid rate 
– not just 3 or 4 percent a year – to catch up. If it doesn’t, then the poor will stay
poor for a long time. People with relatively high human capital are likely to do
reasonably well, but the wealth and income disparities will keep getting wider.
What are possible explanations for the 1990s? Measurement problem? In
many nations like Argentina, the data are sometimes of poor quality.
Moreover, aggregate series can be constructed from available data in different
ways. A Ph.D. student at Carnegie Mellon, José de Anchorena (2004), tried
an alternative way of constructing the capital series but reached the same
conclusion.
Another possibility, and I’d like to return to it because it relates to our
1977 paper about which Ed Prescott talked in his lecture, is that the outcome
for the 1990s in part is the result of what we may call the “time-inconsistency
disease” due to bad policies in Argentina before 1990. People had fresh in
their minds memories from the past, even if former President Carlos Menem
and other politicians did their best to make Argentina a credible country in
which to invest for the long run. Chances are, then, that Argentina still lacked
the necessary credibility. There was considerable growth during the 1990s,
but not nearly as much as Argentina should have experienced according to
the neoclassical growth model. This conjecture needs to be investigated more
rigorously, but is at least consistent with a growing body of literature (see, for
example, Alvarez and Jermann 2000, Kehoe and Levine 2001, and Kehoe and
Perri 2002) that predicts that fears of defaults and conﬁscations will have a
“headwinds effect” on investment precisely when the economy is in the upswing.
Argentina has recovered in the past couple of years. I already mentioned
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Figure 7. Argentina, Capital Input per working age person. Lower Capital: Lower Real





















































































































that if it doesn’t happen at a rapid speed, if the gap is not closed, then the
poor will stay poor for a long time. How will Argentina restore conﬁdence?
There’s no easy answer. Once credibility has been lost, economists don’t
know much about how to restore it. What is needed is not a policy of patchwork
for a year or two; Argentina needs a policy geared for the long run, with 
credible incentives for innovative activity and human and physical capital 
accumulation yielding returns far into the future.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this brief lecture, I’ve tried to give you a taste of the vast variety of questions,
with the model details dictated accordingly, that have been addressed in 
macroeconomics in the past two decades, all within the framework that serves
as the overall theme for this lecture: the decision problems of the models’ 
people and businesses are explicit, and they are dynamic. I could have provided
hundreds of references. Some of the ones I chose to include are authored or
co-authored by researchers with whom I’ve enjoyed tremendously to interact.
I’m delighted to have them here in Stockholm as my guests.
As there are many students in the audience, I’d like to conclude with some
remarks about learning macroeconomics. Almost all interesting macroeco-
nomic phenomena are dynamic; they are intertemporal. We need to consider
forward-looking people. Unfortunately, dynamic macro is difﬁcult for beginners
to learn; it’s not easy to do dynamics on paper. Perhaps mainly for that reason,
in the past 20 years the gap between research and textbooks has grown wider
and wider. What to do?
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There are some recent attempts to bridge the gap. I like many aspects of
Steve Williamson’s (2005) recent textbook, for example. It may be amazing to
you, however, that I’ve continued to use for so long (supplemented by my
own notes) a textbook ﬁrst published in 1974 by Merton Miller and Charles
Upton (1986). It presents a dynamic framework with many of the features I
have talked about, even life-cycle behavior. These two authors were simply
great economists, and they included in their text the key elements they
thought ought to be present in basic dynamic models of macroeconomics.
One possible remedy for teaching macroeconomics is to use the computer
for computational experiments (see Bjørnestad and Kydland 2004). This
tool, which has been so inﬂuential in modern research, can also help beginning
and intermediate students to master dynamic macroeconomics. The students
can compare model and real-economy cyclical statistics. The computer can
generate plots of impulse responses. Shocks occur in every time period. It’s
hard in practice to disentangle the effects of each particular shock. As at least
one occurs in every period, the shocks are not easy to observe and measure at
the time they occur, and the effects of each are long-lasting. But model eco-
nomies let us strengthen our intuition. For example, with an impulse re-
sponse, one pretends that there hasn’t been a shock for a long time – that the
economy is in its steady state. Then we hit the model economy with a single
shock or impulse and record what happens over a number time periods – a
great aid to students’ intuition.
I would like to stop there and just say: Takk for at dere alle kom for å høre
på meg.
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